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Abstract Synthetic theory of evolution is a superior
integrative biological theory. Therefore, there is nothing
surprising about the fact that multiple attempts of defining
life are based on this theory. One of them even has a status
of NASA’s working definition. According to this defini-
tion, ‘life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of
undergoing Darwinian evolution’ Luisi (Orig Life Evol
Bios 28:613–622, 1998); Cleland, Chyba (Orig Life Evol
Bios 32:387–393, 2002). This definition is often considered
as one of the more theoretically mature definitions of life.
This Darwinian definition has nonetheless provoked a lot of
criticism. One of the major arguments claims that this
definition is wrong due to ‘mule’s problem’. Mules (and
other infertile hybrids), despite being obviously living
organisms, in the light of this definition are considered
inanimate objects. It is strongly counterintuitive. The aim
of this article was to demonstrate that this reasoning is
false. In the later part of the text, I also discuss some other
arguments against the Darwinian approach to defining life.
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Problems with the definition of life
Defining life is a non-standard practice for biologists. This is
mainly due to the fact that biologists can make fruitful
research without this definition (Emmeche 1992). It is even
true in case of objects having an unclear status such as
viruses. However, this is unequivocally true only in case of
‘standard’ biology. New biological fields of research such as
astrobiology, the origins of life, artificial life, and synthetic
biology seem to be strongly dependent on the definition of
life. As suggested by Oliver and Perry, some authors even
believe that the lack of the definition of life is necessary for
further progress in these disciplines (2006). Let us consider
astrobiology: if we want to project a space probe to search
for life on other planets, we have to assume some kind of life
definition which allows us to differentiate living things.
With regard to the origin of life, an interesting analysis has
been made lately by Addy Pross. He argues that there are three
major questions of modern biology: what is life?, how can we
make a simple living object?, and how did life emerge? He also
argues that these questions are strongly connected with each
other. We cannot answer one of these questions without
making attempts to answer the remaining two questions (Pross
2011). Pross’s analysis, however, could be extended if we
consider that astrobiology is not only interested in the ques-
tion, how we can find extraterrestrial life, but also in another
fundamental problem, where could life spontaneously emerge.
According to such an approach, astrobiology is considered as
strongly related to the research dealing with the origin of life.
Astrobiology, however, makes the problem complicated.
As we have no broadly accepted definition of life, exploration
of organic molecules and water is still the main way of
searching for extraterrestrial life forms (Chyba and Hand
2005) However, astrobiologists often postulated that living
beings could be built differently than their earthly counterparts
(Schulze-Makuch and Irwin 2006). This hypothesis has been
recently extended to the so-called alternative forms of life
which probably exist on our planet. Carol Cleland and Shelley
Copley claim that our methods of detecting and examining
microbes are ‘blind’ when looking for different kinds of bio-
chemistry. So even on Earth, we can expect organisms with
different genetic codes, using more amino acids than all the
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known forms of life or using amino acids with different chi-
rality or maybe even more distinct from ‘standard’ life forms
(Cleland and Copley 2005). Observation of GFAJ-1 bacteria
from Mono Lake, which are capable of using arsenic instead of
phosphorus, seems to be the first step to confirm this hypoth-
esis (Wolfe-Simon et al. 2010). (This case, of course, should be
very carefully interpreted.) However, if this assumption is true,
the question about artificial creation and the natural emergence
of life can be more complicated and challenging. The question
whether it is possible to create a single theory of the origin of
life is especially problematic. How abstract can it be without
the loss of the ability of explanation and prediction? On the one
hand, we can create a definition that ‘captures’ all life-like
objects, but it does not refer to the mechanisms of their
emerging. On the other hand, we can construct a definition that
implies a specific scenario of the origin of life, but it is very
restrictive. Both solutions have their weaknesses.
Another challenge of defining life is the artificial life
(further referred to as ALife). The thesis that the form of
living beings can be separated and implemented in a med-
ium other than that made of organic compounds (in other
words, the thesis about the multiple realization of life) is
broadly shared by theorists of strong ALife (Emmeche
1992; Boden 2000). Contrary to astrobiology, this claim is
strongly supported by a lot of real artificial objects (mainly
computer simulations) that manifest most of fundamental
life’s properties such as reproduction, evolution, self-sus-
tainability or purposeful-like behavior. The most popular
ones are Christopher Langton’s Loops, Thomas Ray’s Ti-
erra and Craig Reynolds’ Boids (Swan 2009). The thesis
about the multiple realization of life makes all attempts to
define living phenomena based on physicochemistry very
complicated if not impossible. If we accept it, we have to
deny the possibility of giving a single answer to the ques-
tions: how can we ‘‘build’’ life? and how can life sponta-
neously emerge? On the other hand, we can of course ignore
ALife objects, e.g., due to their different ontological nature.
But then we are faced with an uncomfortable dilemma, as
we must explain what the nature of differences and—more
importantly—why we agree with the multiple realization
hypothesis according to astrobiology denying at the same
time multiple realization hypothesis according to ALife.
The concept of biological convergence also fully corre-
sponds to the aforementioned thesis about the multiple
realization of life (indeed, one of the multiple realization
concept fathers—Jerry Fodor appealed exactly to this part
of biological knowledge (Block and Fodor 1972)).
Evolutionary definitions
The above analysis demonstrates that there are a lot of
problems connected with the definition of life and that one
issue is especially important. It is the conflict between the
functional and the physico-chemical approaches. Some
authors suppose that this state (lack of consensus) is normal
and cannot be changed. Edouard Machery claims that
researchers from different branches of biology are inter-
ested in developing different definitions of life. It results
from the discrepancy between various disciplines. Astro-
biologists try to formulate a biochemical definition due to
the practical facility of use, but ALife aspires to a func-
tional definition because it is an attempt, for example, to
synthesize real life in a non-organic medium (2011). Ma-
chery also believes that there is no instance of judgment
which is able to choose between different definitions
(2011). Similar skeptical arguments are proposed by Cle-
land and Chyba. According to their view, creation of a
universal definition of life is impossible, because we do not
have any kind of mature biological theory. The afore-
mentioned authors compare our modern attempts of
defining life to the attempts of defining water after
molecular chemistry (Cleland and Chyba 2002). So,
although we are able to generate a lot of definitions, there is
no reason to consider one of them as correct.
The above-mentioned reflections are surprising for
many reasons. First of all, they seem to ignore the synthetic
theory of evolution—the central, fundamental and most
integrative theory of modern biology. The synthetic theory
of evolution can be used, at least in some degree, to
evaluate different propositions of life definitions. Conse-
quently, there is no wonder that the synthetic theory of
evolution has been often used to define life. The most
famous attempt is the so-called Darwinian or standard
definition of life, created by G.F. Joyce. According to that
definition ‘life is a self-sustaining chemical system capable
to undergoing Darwinian evolution’ (Luisi 1998; Cleland
and Chyba 2002; Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). This definition
is often said to be one of the most theoretically mature
attempts to define life and has even reached the status of
NASA’s working definition of life (Luisi 1998; Ruiz-Mi-
razo et al. 2004).
Before Joyce’s definition, the evolutionary definition of
life was put forward by many theorists including John
Maynard Smith. In the first chapter of his book The
Problems of Biology, he analyzed the conditions of evo-
lution. According to the author, there are three fundamental
prerequisites of evolution: variability, reproduction and
inheritance. A set of elements (in other words, a population
of individuals) will be changed in time (evolve), if its
elements share these three properties and under the con-
dition that at least a part of variability influences the chance
of their survival and reproduction (Maynard Smith 1986).
In other words, a living thing is an object which belongs to
a set of elements characterized by variability, reproduction
and inheritance. I propose to call this kind of definition a
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purely evolutionary definition. There are many other
examples of evolutionary definitions. One of them is cre-
ated by Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo, Juli Pereto´ and Alvaro Moreno
and it defines a living being as an ‘autonomous system with
open-ended evolutionary capacities’ (2004). However,
according to this view, evolution can be interpreted more
widely than in accordance with the standard or the purely
evolutionary definition. With some objections also, the
cybernetic definition of life by Bernard Korzeniewski
should be considered as one of the evolutionary definitions’
family. The author of this conception reinterprets standard
evolutionary requirements for life in cybernetic terms
(Korzeniewski 2001, 2005). However, some of his con-
clusions are contrary to the genetic interpretation of evo-
lution (selfish gene hypothesis) (Korzeniewski 2005).
Notwithstanding this fact, it seems to be a very original
conception with great emphasis on formal and methodo-
logical aspects of life’s definition.
The advantages of the evolutionary approach to life
definition are difficult to overestimate. Firstly, the defini-
tion is grounded in the framework of the proven biological
theory; it allows to reject a lot of skeptical arguments based
on linguistic reasons (lack of transparency, ambiguity and
other linguistic problems are often used against the possi-
bility of life definition—see works of Oliver and Perry
(2006) or Cleland and Chyba (2002), for example). This
theoretical frame also shows relations between the terms
used to build the definition, so the said definition is not a
simple list of properties (El-Hani 2008).
Second, evolutionary definitions (with some exceptions
such as Ruiz-Mirazo’s and co-authors’ propositions) refer
to a specific kind of biogenesis models. I do not mean any
specific model, but rather a family of models in which it
is assumed that replication emerged before self-mainte-
nance and cellularity (Luisi 1998). Obviously, a pure
evolutionary definition does not specify if it is a variant of
Eigen’s hypercycle theory, a variant of RNA world
hypothesis or something similar, nevertheless it provides a
solid frame of research. This is a very important fact.
According to this view, the relation between defining life
and the scenarios of its origin is necessary to avoid
making the problem of defining life a semantic problem
only (Luisi 1998; Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). In other
words, the reciprocal impact of the definitions and the
origin of life scenarios add empirical sense to the
definition.
Furthermore, all evolutionary definitions have a ten-
dency to be highly abstract, but they are not useless due to
the possibility of ‘filling up’ their more concrete empirical
content. We can demonstrate, for example, what mecha-
nisms are responsible for inheritance in case of the known
organisms. Moreover, we are able to predicate (certainly in
some degree) what features a hypothetical extraterrestrial
or alternative life must have (Maynard Smith 1986). An
abstract character makes this kind of definition attractive
for the non-classic disciplines of biology such as astrobi-
ology or artificial life. Thus, the thesis about multiple
realization of life is saved.
‘Mule’s problem’
The aforementioned advantages of evolutionary definitions
of life have been strongly criticized. One of the arguments
is considered especially deadly for the Darwinian
approach. It refers to the simple consideration that organ-
isms without reproductive capacity are inanimate objects in
the light of the above definition. It is, of course, strongly
counter-intuitive.
There are a lot of versions and variations of this argu-
ment. In the most typical version, the sterile animal is a
mule—a hybrid of a horse and a donkey (Cleland and
Chyba 2002; Korzeniewski 2005; Machery 2011; see also
Oliver and Perry (2006)). This is also the strongest version.
For this reason, I will call this argument ‘mule’s problem’.
But in some variations, other objects are considered, for
example, single members of any given species and even
humans who do not reproduce by choice (Koshland 2002;
Korzeniewski 2005). This argumentation is not always
considered in the context of evolutionary definitions as the
‘mule’s problem’ is more universal and is connected with
all kinds of life definitions which hold that reproduction is
a fundamental property of life. But this line of argumen-
tation is always the same—it is reductio ad absurdum. Such
definitions claim that the mule is both an animate and an
inanimate object.
The antagonists’ argumentation has never been precisely
demonstrated, probably due to fact that the character of
mule’s case is considered as problematic ‘per se’. How-
ever, some authors try to challenge this argumentation.
Bernard Korzeniewski, for example, claims that
‘The reasoning concerning the non-reproduction
people applies equally well to other biological indi-
viduals that do not reproduce, for example to sterile
inter-species hybrids such as mule. Again, they are
defective living individuals. They are alive in sense
that they perform all biological function but repro-
duction (), like a defective TV set performs many
electronic functions but display image. However,
they are completely nonsensical from the purely
biological point of view’ (Korzeniewski 2005).
The line of defense mentioned above, however, has a lot
of weak sides. One of its main faults is that it leads to a
conclusion that evolutionary definitions cannot be used in
the exact and exceptionless manner.
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Another line of argumentation is proposed by Tibor
Ga´nti—the author of chemoton theory. It must be high-
lighted that this is not an evolutionary theory, because the
self-maintenance abilities of living units are considered
more fundamental than the ability to evolve. However,
Ga´nti’s proposition is quite often considered as a solution
to the ‘mule’s problem’ (and similar problems).
Ga´nti distinguishes two groups of life criteria: real or
absolute criteria of life and potential criteria of life. The
first kind includes inherent unity, metabolism, inherent
stability, information carrying subsystem and a program
control. According to Ga´nti, these phenomena are neces-
sary for a system to be considered as a living system. The
living system displays these phenomena in every moment
of existence (Ga´nti 2003). The second kind, which is more
important for the present analysis, includes growth and
reproduction (reproduction is considered a specific type of
growth), a capability of hereditary change and evolution,
and mortality. Ga´nti claims that these phenomena are not
necessary for the existence of any single individual but are
‘indispensable to the survival of the living world’ (Ga´nti
2003). The author of the chemoton theory argues that this
difference allows to avoid the paradox connected with
sterile hybrids, too old or too young organisms to repro-
duce, castrated animals, etc., because the ability to repro-
duce is only potential (Ga´nti 2003). The same point of view
is represented by his critics—Eo¨rs Szathma´ry and James
Griesemer (Szathma´ry 2003; Griesemer 2003). Eo¨rs
Szathma´ry writes even that Ga´nti’s solution cuts off ‘the
endless debate about whether (…) mule is alive or not’
(Szathma´ry 2003). Szathma´ry claims that Ga´nti’s idea
allows to clearly demonstrate that a set of objects able to
evolve and a set of living units are two different sets. They
have not only a common part (‘normal’ organisms), but
also separated parts (viruses, replicating programs on one
hand and mules and old animals on the other, for example)
(Szathma´ry 2003).
But, is it really a satisfying solution? I could agree with
Szathma´ry’s view of two overlapping sets, because this can
be easily adjusted to an evolutionary definition, especially
to the NASA’s working version. (This definition also
excludes only self-sustaining and only evolving objects
from the set of living entities.) But I deny that Ga´nti’s
solution can be uncritically accepted. In my opinion, the
reason for distinguishing the two criteria types is not clear
enough. The claim that potential criteria are necessary for
survival of life is wrong from an evolutionary point of
view. There is no known evolutionary mechanism whose
goal is to save the life of biosphere. This hypothetical
mechanism should have some kind of long-term anticipa-
tion ability, which grants access to the knowledge of the
future environmental conditions. Evolution, however, is
not able to predict the future. Individuals that are better
adapted to the environment right now have a better chance
to reproduce, unlike these who could be able to better
reproduce in the hypothetical future conditions. The con-
clusion is that although Ga´nti correctly recognized that
sterile animals are living individuals, he did not give us any
solid reasons for accepting this point of view.
Below, I will present how the evolutionary definition
can deal with this argument without a resort to exceptions
(like in the Korzeniewski’s propositions) and without
appealing to the unknown mechanisms of evolution (like in
Ga´nti’s point of view). To fulfill this goal, we must first
consider the ‘mule’s problem’ argumentation in detail:
(1) Darwinian definition claims that living is that, what is
capable of undergoing evolution through natural
selection.
(2) One of the conditions of evolution is reproduction.
(3) So mule is unable to reproduce.
(4) Therefore, mule is an inanimate object.
(5) The conclusion is absurd, so the definition must be
wrong.
If we want to prove that the above reasoning is false, we
must reconstruct a weaker version of this argument. It will
be an artificially prepared argument but not essentially
different from those dealing with isolated animals or
humans who do not want to reproduce. Let us consider an
animal which died before reproduction took place. Points
(1) and (2) do not change.
(3) The animal did not reproduce.
(4) The animal was an inanimate object.
(5) The conclusion is absurd, so the definition must be
wrong.
Now we clearly see the mistake hidden in the argu-
mentation. If the natural selection requires variability of
survival and reproduction, the thesis that all organisms
must reproduce themselves is certainly wrong. Evolution-
ary definitions holding that life evolves through natural
selection say something completely different. Some
organisms (in certain environmental conditions) will not
reproduce at all or will have lower number of descendants
than their competitors.
Where does the force of this argumentation come from?
I suppose that it stems from the faulty formulation of the
first premise (even if only implicitly). It is suggested that if
something is living, it must evolve and because we usually
think that ‘it’ must be an equivalent of ‘individual’, we
arrive at the conclusion that an individual must be able to
reproduce. But it is of course a mistake because evolution
is not a property of individuals, it is a property of popu-
lations! Reproduction must be a property of objects
belonging to a population, but there is no requirement that
all objects in the set must manifest this property in the
same degree.
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How does the above analysis affect the ‘mule’s prob-
lem’? The aforementioned mule is in no way a more
problematic case than the hypothetical animal mentioned
above. Someone can say that a pack of mules will obvi-
ously never evolve. However, it is a wrong perspective.
This paradox disappears if we consider the case from the
genes point of view. The espousal of the genetic perspec-
tive does not change the conditions of evolution but instead
of speaking about population we talk about gene pools. In
this case, it is certainly obvious that a mule shares the same
genes as its parents, which are capable of reproduction, and
other relatives, which are not sterile hybrids. The gene pool
containing genes of ‘our mule’ can of course evolve
through natural selection. The conclusion is the following:
mule is a living individual, because it is a part belonging to
an evolving population. To be precise, a mule—considered
as a vehicle of survival—is a living object, because of
owning the genes which constitute a part of an evolving
gene pool. Evolutionary definitions are collective defini-
tions and an object cannot be accounted as a living or non-
living one without a broader population perspective.
This does not mean that the population perspective is
sufficient to define life. The living objects should be
defined on the basis of other characteristics too. Otherwise,
we face the problem of other objects generated by popu-
lation (e.g., artifacts or excretions). Should they consider
living entities? Of course they should not. Although they
are the products of population, they do not share the above-
mentioned additional features. But what are these addi-
tional properties? This is the matter requiring subtle
investigations. However, probably the most important of
them is self-maintenance (metabolism). But the relations
between metabolism and evolution are not clear enough.
The result is that we are unable to make a universal defi-
nition of life, although we can propose a working version.
In my opinion, it could have the following form: ‘Life (a
living individual) is a self-sustaining object belonging to a
set of elements capable of undergoing Darwinian evolu-
tion’. As we can see, this definition is very similar to the
Joyce’s conception. However, contrary to Joyce, I consider
self-sustaining as an ability of any single individual, not of
the whole system. According to this view, the word ‘life’ as
a synonym of a ‘living individual’ should refer only to the
members of population. Any elements of the members or
any systems more complex than population should be
called ‘alive’.
Now we can also see the nature of the above-mentioned
Ga´nti’s conception. His solution refers to a non-collective
view upon life. Therefore, Ga´nti has to suppose that
reproduction is one of the potential criteria that can be
applied to avoid the ‘mule’s problem’. But this supposition
makes his conception sensitive to another type of criticism.
Contrary to Ga´nti’s solution, the evolutionary conception
of life treats life as a collective phenomenon, therefore the
capacity of evolving (the reproduction is one of require-
ments for evolution) is considered as a real and not a
potential property of life. The little differences in the per-
ception of life makes Ga´nti’s conception and the Darwinian
definition face two different types of problems, although
they can be considered quite similar (at least at some level
of abstraction). But as I tried to show above, the main
problem with the Darwinian definition and other evolu-
tionary conception is rather illusive.
Life as a collective phenomenon
Some authors accurately recognize that the Darwinian
definition is a collective definition and that it is impossible
to use it to evaluate the status of objects not belonging to
some higher level system (population) (Luisi 1998, Ruiz-
Mirazo et al. 2004). But some of them also consider this
fact as a great disadvantage of a standard definition of life,
e.g., Luisi claims that this feature makes this definition
useless especially for astrobiology, because it is not oper-
ational. Let us suppose that we find a single object on
another planet. We cannot decide if it is a living individual
or not (Luisi 1998). The second problem involves obser-
vation of evolution: how long must we wait to record
effects of natural selection (Luisi 1998)? Similar arguments
are discussed by Cleland and Chyba (2002).
These arguments are strongly interrelated, but the sec-
ond one is easier to defeat. Contrary to the popular belief,
the process of natural selection can be observed (Carroll
et al. 2007). The rate of change in a population is related to
the duration of the individuals’ life cycle. Therefore, in the
case we most expect of extraterrestrial life which is the
existence of alien microorganisms, we will be able to
observe the functioning of the fundamental mechanisms of
evolution. Even if we cannot observe this process, e.g., due
to a long life cycle of species’ members, we can establish
theoretically that these organisms are capable of undergo-
ing Darwinian evolution. As Pier Luigi Luisi suggests, we
would be able to evaluate it because we can study genetic
mechanisms of these life forms (Luisi 1998). Benner shares
the same point of view (2010). According to him, we are
able to identify the molecules which can support the evo-
lution through natural selection (Benner 2010), since any
kind of biopolymer that is able to support the Darwinian
evolution must be able to change its structure (and this
property is connected with the ability of changing the
information that is carried by this chemical compound)
without the loss of ability to replicate. Benner says that
only a few known chemical structures can fulfill this
requirement (2010). The comparative studies of nucleoac-
ids (RNA and DNA) lead to the conclusion that Darwinian
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evolution is possible due to specific structural features of
these compounds. As Benner explains,
‘the phosphates that link the nucleoside building blocks
together in the DNA backbone each carry a negative
charge. This makes DNA a polyelectrolyte, a molecule
with multiple charges. The repeating backbone charge
dominates the properties of the DNA molecule so much
that changing one of the uncharged nucleobases (and
thereby changing the information encoded by the DNA
molecule) scarcely alters the physical behavior of the DNA
molecule.
The repeating backbone charge helps DNA support
Darwinian evolution in other ways (). For example:
(a) The repeating backbone charge keeps RNA and DNA
dissolved in water.
(b) The repeating backbone charge forces interactions
between strands to occur as far from the backbone as
possible, as the backbone charges from one strand
repel the backbone charges from the other (). The
Watson–Crick interactions essential to the ability of
DNA to replicate arise because of interstrand inter-
actions far from the backbone.
(c) The repeating backbone charge keeps the DNA and
RNA molecules from folding, allowing them to act as
templates’ (Benner 2010).
Without entering into the details of Benner’s hypothesis,
we can claim that this proposition is very earth-centric (the
polyelectrolyte hypothesis presented by Benner does not
assume the thesis of the multiple realization of life). As a
matter of fact, this issue is correctly recognized by the
author himself (Benner 2010). I therefore argue that the
observational method of detection of the evolution process
through natural selection is more accurate (even if it is
more difficult from a technical point of view), especially if
we deal with microorganisms. It is also easy to notice that
the above-mentioned methods do not exclude each other.
We can use them both to verify if the population of the
foreseeable alien organisms is able to fulfill the require-
ments of the Darwinian evolution.
However, what can we say about the situation men-
tioned in the first more sophisticated argument? What can
we do when we find a single object only? I argue that this
argumentation assumes a wrong point of departure known
from science fiction movies. The suppositions that astro-
nauts or artificial probes can find highly complex organ-
isms in any given moonscape is nonsensical due to the fact
that complexity of organisms is proportional to the com-
plexity of their ecological niche (Korzeniewski 2005). So it
is rather impossible to discover any kind of an ‘alien
elephant’ in an environment without other highly complex
living structures. This argument also applies to the
unicellular organisms. However, in the case of microbes,
we can construct additional reasoning. If we consider
simple organisms such as terrestrial bacteria, it is rather
impossible to find a single member of species itself. If we
suppose that extraterrestrial microbes are a product of
Darwinian evolution, we must also suppose that they
adapted to their surroundings. So are we justified to assume
that they will occur in endemic numbers? We should rather
suppose that they will be found in a quantity compared to
the numbers of terrestrial bacteria or archaea. And they are
practically always represented in large numbers even in
extreme environments. For example, the psychrophilic and
psychrotolerant bacteria received from sea-ice of Arctic
Ocean amount to 46,180 cfu/ml, (Helmke and Weyland
2004). So I claim that the doubts about the operational
character of the Darwinian definition are magnified. The
arguments presented above are valid only if we suppose
that they are rather of a technical than of a fundamental
nature. However, let us consider the fact that if we treat all
technical problems as reasons to stop research, the science
will not be able to make progress.
It is of note that the above-mentioned arguments involve
reasoning by analogy. For this reason, they can be fallible.
But I suppose that we should assume some universality of
laws, mechanisms and properties, if we discuss the alter-
native forms of life. Otherwise, it is completely incom-
prehensible, why we want to use the word ‘life’ in relation
to these alternative forms. This supposition does not only
apply to the problem of the quantity of extraterrestrial
organisms. It also refers to the problem of the evolution
pattern. I claim that it is very difficult to imagine the
evolution process totally excluding the natural selection
mechanisms. The Lamarkian evolution is usually consid-
ered a counter-example, but it is not correct, because the
Lamarkian evolution does not deny the natural selection,
but rather complements it. Let us consider the RNA
organisms in the RNA world. Cleland and Chyba claim that
they are problematic for the Darwinian definition (2002).
But is it really true? It is not, because the RNA organisms
can still undergo the evolution through natural selection,
even though the Darwinian mechanisms are supported by
other kind of evolution. According to Darwinian approach
to defining life, there is no reason to exclude the Lamar-
kian-like organisms, if they are able to undergo the Dar-
winian process too. I suppose that the satisfying definition
of life should ‘catch’ the minimal properties of life (com-
mon between all life’s forms). The additional features (e.g.,
inheritance of acquired properties, learning, complex
behavior or consciousness) should be omitted. The same
reasoning applies to ALife objects. Although some of them
can exhibit non-Darwinian patterns of evolution, it is rather
difficult to imagine the real-like environmental conditions
without influence on the chance of reproduction of ALife
objects. The conclusion is that although the Darwinian
44 Theory Biosci. (2014) 133:39–45
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approach to defining life generally does not exclude the
multiple realization of life, not all the entities created by
A-lifers should be considered living individuals.
Conclusions
I tried to demonstrate that the Darwinian and other kinds
of evolutionary definitions are not as vulnerable as their
critics say. ‘Mule’s problem’, allegedly so problematic,
seems to be due to a confusion of the biological hierarchy
levels in which objects are able to evolve (namely the
populations but not the individuals). Moreover, the argu-
ments relating to the operational character of definition
fail if we consider life as a collective phenomenon.
However, it should be emphasized that the Darwinian
definition (or my own working definition mentioned
above) does not dispel all doubts about the problem of
defining life. It does not cast enough light on the problem
of the relation between evolution and the second major
property of life—self-maintenance. As Freeman Dyson
suggests, the research of the relationship between these
features, namely the evolution and self-maintenance and
their mutual connection has often been neglected (Dyson
1985). Ruiz-Mirazo and his co-workers also argue that the
evolutionary definition, even in its more sophisticated
form of the standard life definition, does not explain the
character of ‘material organization of living that would
allow to beginning of a process of Darwinian evolution’
enough (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). (Detailed Ga´nti’s
analysis of the nature of inherent self-maintenance unity
should be in this context very useful, if it can be adjus-
ted—and I think it can—to the evolutionary point of
view.) Another unsolved problem is the status of ALife
objects. Evolved programs should be recognized as life in
the context of a ‘pure evolutionary’ definition. But even if
they evolve according to the pattern of Darwinian evolu-
tion, are there really no differences between them and
standard organisms? NASA’s working definition excluded
ALife objects; the reason is that they are not chemical
systems. However, we are faced with another question.
We must explain why we cannot claim that this assump-
tion is not arbitrary. These issues require further investi-
gations and research.
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